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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
WA
E. CARROLL and :MARY vV.
CARROLL, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
PHIL M. BIRDSALL and l\L
LaVERNE BIRDSALL, husband and
wife,
Def endants-Appellamts.

Case No.
11854

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STArrEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
rl'hi8 is an action by Plaintiffs-Respondents, as
sellers on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, to repossess
n·al Pstate from the Defendants - Appellants, buyers on
said Unifonn Real Esfate Contract. It is also an action
Rreking attorney's fees pursuant to the terms of said
eontract, and is an action for treble damages under the
provisions of Chapter 36, Title 78, Utah Code AnnotatPd, for any unlawful withholding of said real estate.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a non-jury trial on the merits, the lower court
grantPd judgmt>nt to th(" Plaintiff8. rrlw lower court
found Defendants in default on the Contract and gave

2

judgment awarding tli<• Plaintiffs i1111nPdiat<· J'('"t't
1:
,, l l1 :Id'
of tlw rPa.l <'stat<> in q:1estio11, and !1niet<'d titlP rn ti:•
Plaintiffs. Also, Plaintiffs "<'J e awai·ded .irnlgmPnt fr.,
$85.00 per month l'<'n t from March 13, 19(iS, the day fui
lo-w'ing the servic<· of the N otict> to Pa>- or Quit,
:
initiated these proceedings, to and including thL· 1st dir ,
of July, 19G9, the da:· pre{·eding the concln:,;ion of tl;e
trial proceedings herein. In addition, the low0r cour'
awarded $8.50 lWl' day rent from tlw 2nd day of Jn!;
19G9, to and including the day that the Def Pndants quii
the property.

REL1E1'' SOUGHrr ON APPEAL
Dt>fondanh; seek rvversal of the judgment, and Sl'l'K
revie'v h,\' the appt>llate court of the evidence of reconl
Defendants further s<·ek a determination by the appellate
court that the Uniform Real Estate Contract in questio:,
was not in default at the time the Plaintiffs commenct l
their
action; a determinatiou of what tlw
contract balance was at the time the repossession arni
unlawful d<:>tainer action was emmnenet>d; au award o:
attorney's fees and eosts in this case to the Defendant;
a detennination that the attorney\; fees and costs awaro
able to D<>fendants are an allowable off-set against an'.
payments Defendanb should have made on the mon
1
gage subsequent to the commencement of the action '·
question; a deterrn ination that the costs allowrd ili
Plaintiffs by the low(•r court are improper an d' there·
fore, disallowed; a determination that Def
entitled to possession of the premises in ques t'ion. a1',
1

that the Writ of Restitution be immediately vacated; a
Jdermination that title to said premises be quieted in
tlw lM't>ndanh;, and that Plaintiffs he compelled to deed
property to the Defendants; and a determination
that the case be remanded to the trial court to determine
Khat the outstanding mortgage indebtedness is against
property, and after com;idering attorney's fees and
costs, direct the lower court to determine whether or not
then· is a deficiency in favor of Plaintiffs, or whether
or not there might be monies owing the Defendants.
Should the evidence be such that there would be a deficiency owing in favoT of Plaintiffs, then Defendants
oeek an order of the appellate court directing the lower
il
conrt to satisfy said deficiency ont of funds now on
:·il
de.posit with the Salt Lake County Clerk. Should there
be monies owing the Defendants, then they seek an order
of the appellate court directing the lower court to im10 ,
i press a lien against escrow funds in the account of the
tli1 1 Plaintiffs with Doxey-Layton Company, and to enter
Judgment against the Plaintiffs for any additional funds
lo: owing the Defendants.
1

nt;.
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an,,

In the event the appellate court finds the weight
of the evidence and the issues against the DefondantsAppellants, then said Defendants seek release of the
funds on deposit with the Salt Lake County Clerk, and
an order directing said Clerk to pay said funds over
to the Defendants. In addition, the Defendants-Appellunts would also request that a jndg111ent be entered
against the Plaintiff-Respondents, in the amount the
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payments on the ('On tract by the Defendants exceeds thP
reasonable rental value of the property.

STATEMJDNT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs 8old Defendants their home on a 1Inifon11
Real Estate Contract, dated July 1, 1954. The sale prir·p
was $11,950.00. Said Contract reserved monthly ]Jay
ments of $100.00 (R. 3).
On March 12, 19G8, the Plaintiffa caused to be serveri
on the Defendant .M. LaVerne Birdsall a notice winch
put the Defendants on notice that tht•y were delinquPn!
in their monthly payments $2,175.00, and the
were further notified that the balance on the contract
as of December 5, 1967, was in the amount of $4,740..U.
The Defendants were required by said notice to bring
current the debnquent payments on or before .March
1968, and pay "a reasonable attorney's fee of $475.50."
(Emphasis added.) A::-1 an alternati\'e thereto, the De·
f endants were given the option to give up possession of
the subject property and forfeit all pa)111ents ma<le
thereon as liquidated damages to the Plaintiffs (R. 4).
A copy of said notice was personally served on the De·
fendant M. LaVerne Birdsall (R. 5), and a copy thereof
was left for Defendant Phil M. Birdsall by learing same j
with Defendant M. La Verne Birdsall. A copy thereol 1
was not mailed addressed to Defendant Phil· M. B'irdsall
at his place of residence or his place of business (R 01·
'
I'
11 farch ·.v.
A second notice was served on Defendants on 11
.•
l r1re1n1se·
1968, notifying the Defendants to vaca t e t 1e
i

I
I

..........
I
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(R. 7). Although the record discloses that both Defendants were
served the second notice (R. 8), the
on the second notice was effected in the same
manner as was the service of the first notice, with no
personal service being made on Defendant Phil M. Birdsal, and with no mailing being made to said Defendant.

As of March 12, 1968, the Defendants should have
paid monthly payments under the terms of the Contract
(R. 3) in the total amount of $17,000.00, exclusive of
(axes and insurance. A careful review of all of the
accountings on file in this case will show that the
fendants had paid in excess of $17,000.00 on the Contract at the date they were given Notice to Pay or Quit
(app. I). On that date, according to Lionel M. Farr,
attorney for Plaintiffs, Defendants were indebted to
Plaintiffs in the amount of $4,102.06 (Ex. 42-P & app.
Il). According to Lorin Blauer, the clerk who did the
accounting for the Defendants, the Defendants were indebted to the Plaintiffs in the amount of $2,792.71 (Ex.
32-D & app. II). Defendants respectfuly submit that the
appropriate adjusted contract balance as of that same
date would more closely approximate $3,350.44 ( app.
lII). There was an outstanding mortgage against the
premises on which at that date the Plaintiffs owed DoxeyLayton Company the amount of $3,647.39 (Ex. 31-D).
Rad the Defendants paid the Plaintiffs rents on the
property in question, they would have paid $14,025.00
from the date of the Contract to the date of the first
notice, assuming a monthly rental rate of $85.00 per
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rnonth and a total of $11,550.00, assuming a montlih
rental rate of $70.00 per month (app. I).
By letter dated April 8, 1968, this author,
for the Defendants, advised Mr. Lionel M. Farr, atto;.
ney for the Plaintiffs, that the amount sought to he
recovered by the Plaintiffs was greatly in dispute and
that an accounting was desired before any conclusiono
could be made ( R. 10). Notwithstanding Defendants'
efforts to affect a reconciliation of the problC'm through
a proper accounting, Plaintiffs conunenced action in this
case on April 15, 1968, seeking repossession of the pro]Jerty, treble damages, and attorney's fees (R. 2). On
April 23, 19G8, the Def t>ndants filed a responsive plea-0ing in which, among other things, they asserted the legal
insufficiency of the Notices to Quit, denied the entitlement of the Plaintiffs to treble damages, denied the
Plaintiffs' right to an attorney's fee, and plead facts to
support the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to repossession of the premises in question (R. 911). In addition, by way of counterclaim filed the same
date, Defendants generally asserted their right to have
an accounting in this case and, that at the conclusion of
such an accounting, that the Court grant appropriat"
relief to the parties to afford reasonable protection of
the rights of the respective parties, without permitting
an unconscionable forfeiture to take place (R. 12-15).
Judge Stewart M. Hanson announced at the com,:
mencement of the trial of this case on the llt11 day oi
. penml a
June, 1969, that the Court could not all ow 01

!

I

1

I
I
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forfeiture by the Defendants of their interest in the
real estate, as snch would be an unconscionable forfeiture.
Judge Hanson reiterated this point throughout the
and finally memorialized that conclusion in writing by
the execution and filing of a Memorandum Decision on
.fuly 2, 1969. The Court in its written Memorandum
Decision concluded that the Defendants were indebted to
the Plaintiffs in the amount of $4,133.24 on the Contract,
and that the Defendants were in d<•fault on said Contract;
however, the Court found that it would be an unconscionable forfeiture to deprive the Defendants of their
equity in the property and denied restitution of the
premises to the Plaintiffs. The Court concluded that the
Plaintiffs were not entited to treble damages, that the
Plaintiffs were entitled to $500.00 attorney's fees, plus
costs, and that the Plaintiffs were entitled to enteT judgment against the Defendants for $1,128.23. The
fendants were admonished to refinance the property to
pay the Plaintiffs on said judgment and, upon payment
thereof, the Plaintiffs were directed to deed the property
to the Defendants (R. 59-61).
After Judge Hanson had made his initial decision,
and after he had caused said decision to be reduced to
writing, signed same, and caused it to be filed with the
clerk's office, then the tenacious litigants and lawyers
engaged in numerous motions, arguments, and the application of much pressure. Preliminary entreaties were
rnade of the Court and the Court then seemed to yield
to the pressure, finally allowing counsel for the Plain-

8
tiffs to submit Findings of Fact and Conclu:-;ions of La'.'·
and a Judgment, but consistent with tlw views of
for the Plaintiffs, rather tl1an with the l\frmoranrlm:i
Decision. Said Findings of Fact, Condusious of La11.
and Judgment were in fact prepared and snhmitted t11
the Court and sigrn·d li>· tlw Conrt and fikd in the dPrk"
office on Augnst :25, 19G9 ( R. G5-69). After
objections and arguments were made, thP. Conrt dirPc\11.
Mr. Farr to prepare final Findings, Conelu:,;ions, an1I
Judgment. On September :23, 1969, this author callel
Mr. Farr and advised him that he had received check>
from the Defendanb, amounting to $:2,000.00 and tl1a:
consistent with the Memorandum Decision, the Defend·
ants would pay $1,233.90 as the original amount of th1
judgment, plus costs of $22.40, and attorney's fees 01
$500.00 for a dismissal of the casP. without an>· frn1h1:
proceedings, and for a deed to the property in question
'l'his off er of settlement was flatly rejected by the Plaw

i
1

1·

tiffs and their attorney.
Finally, the complete about-face was completed b!
the Court in the entrv of final Findings of Fact, Con
.
clusions of Law, and .Judgment, on September 25, u
(R. 101-06), though the second set of Findings, Cnn
clusions and Judgment was at variance from the firstsr·'. 1
which is on file herein. Mr. Farr then proceeded in:
011
mediately to obtain a \\Trit of Restitution on the 2Gth ' I
of
1969 (R 19-20), and before any
,.
.
.
c1
t l ad
been given to this author that t1ie ;our 1 ·
judgment in this c&8'' (R. 107), and that the Defendtlnl

I
I

l

]

i
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were in a perilous situation. Defendanfa were afforded
no opportunity to make any objections to the final Findings, Conclusions, and Judment, and were afforded no
opportunity to have a bond fixed h:- the lower court to
stay execution on the Judgment. 'J1lie appeal then followed.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE APPELLATE COURT IS REQUIRED TO PASS
UPON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

Since the Plaintiffs in this case sought enforcement
of the contractual provisions which pe.rmit a forfeiture
the Defendants of amounts paid on the contract, and
which permit the Plaintiffs the right to re-enter and to
re-take possession of the premises, rather than seeking
monetary damages, this case is one ordinarily cognizable
in equity, rather than in law. In such cases, the appellate court is required to consider the entire record and
pass upon the weight of the evidence. Croft v. Jensen,
86 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198, 203 (Utah, 1935); Cline v. Hullnm, 435 P .2d 152, 154 (Okla., 1967). It is respectfully
submitted that the weight of the admissable competent
evidence in this case is inconsistent with the conclusions
reached by the lower court in several respects, and these
inconsistencies will be reviewed with particularity in the
arguments hereinafter to follow.
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POINT II
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
SUPPORT THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION
THAT DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT ON
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract in this case lll'O·
vides that where the seller maintains a loan secured b)
a mortgage against the property that "when the printi·
pal [amount outstanding and due on the contract] ha,
been reduced to the amount of the loan and mortgage,
the seller agrees to convey and the buyer agrees Iii
accept title to the above-described property subject to
said loan and mortgage." (R. 3) The Plaintiffs semd
the Defendants a Notice to Pay or Quit on March 12,
1968 (R. 5). On March 18, 1968, the outstanding balance
owing on the mortgage against the premises by Plaintiffa
to Doxey-Layton Company was in the amount of
(R. 223, Ex. 31-D). The balance owing by
:
to Plaintiffs on the Contract as of March 5, 1968, accord·
ing to the final accounting done by Lionel M. Farr,
attorney for Plaintiff 8, as adjusted for conceded error '
of January 5, 1968, was $4,102.46 (Ex. 42-P). Defend·
ants respectfully submit that the weight of the evidenr.e
supports the conclusion that the corrected contract bal·
ance as of March 5, 1968, should have been $3,350.41
( app. III). Although the Blauer Accounting, as adjuste:
for an error made on the transaction of January 5,
indicates that the Contract balance as of March 12, 19681
was $2,792.91 (Ex. 32-D), an adjustment thereof, con·
.
. the ana1ys1s
. ma d e m
. A ppena·x
III' would. '
sistent
with
I
1
make the contract balance $3,421.45. Accordingly, it '

1

;

I

I

.....ill
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apparent that the net difference between the accountings
of Lionel M. Farr and Lorin R. Blauer is de minimus.
In support of the foregoing observation that Defendants are entitled to additional credits, over and above
those given in the Farr and Carroll Accountings, a brief
review of the record, and the reasons in support of Defendants' contentions, will hereinafter be set forth, as
follows:
1. rrhe Defendants produced an original receipt
dated February 25, 1955, which indicated Phil Birdsall
made a $25.00 payment on the 1315 Gillespie property
(the subject property), and said receipt was signed by
W. E. Carroll (Ex. 15-D). The receipt was admittedly
in Carroll's handwriting (R. 169). The receipt by its
very appearance is old, and certainly is entitled to the

equal dignity of the original accounting record of Mr.
Carroll (Ex. 4-P). Mr. Carroll, in t'xplaining Exhibit
22-P, indicated that he made an entry as of March 7,
1955, and then remembered that the payment had been
made February 23, 1955. Accordingly, he scratched
March 7, 1955, and wrote in February 23, 1955, which
he would have the Court believe was the same payment
as that represented by the receipt of February 25, 1955
(R. 178-79). It seeins incredible to this author that Mr.
Carroll would have such an amazing memory at date of
trial, but would register such uncertainty back in 1955,
Which conclusion is fairly deducible from the question
inark next to the March 7 entrv on Exhibit 22-P. Surely
Mr. Carroll would have had a. copy of the February 25,

12
1955, receipt in hif' re-ceipt hook which wonlcl haw Jiei.
mitted him to adjust the original n·cord, had such an
adjustment been "·ananterl. at th<' tiilll'. .Aecortlingh,
it is respectfully submitted that tlw duly authenticated
receipt is evidencl:' of a quality sufficient to allow addi.
tional credit to the Defendants over and ahore that
given in Plaintiffs' o;:iginal accounting (Gx. ±-P). Sntl1
receipt, standing relatively unimpeached, shonld he
accepted by the Court as the weightier evidl·nce.

2. 'l'he Defendants produced a cancelled check dated
.J annary 10, 1958, made payable to Wayne Carroll b1
:M:. LaVerne Birdsall in the amount of $35.00 (Ex. lG-Di,
which was admittedly endorsed by Carrol! (R. l!i5).
'l'he Carroll Accounting included $35.00 payments for
J annary 6, and January 29, but failed to inelude a pay
ment for .Jannary 10 (J1Jx. 6-P). Mr. Carroll proffereJ
Exhibits 23-P an<l 24-P as evidence that tlw .January JO,
1958, check had bounced. He testified that Exhibit 2:J.P
was for the same check numbl:'r and in the same amonnL
hut said Exhibit does not identify check number 151 (R
181). Moreover, said chargehack slip is dated January
10, 1958, and it seems very unlikely that tlw hank would
make the ehargebaek the sanw day that the check \Ilk
given by the Defendants to the Plaintiffs. Exl1ibit
;
also fails to identify check number 151 of .Tanuan lll,
..
.
·
·
·t· llY that
1958, and Carroll frankly admitted m his tes nno .
he did not know what happened during that period of
01
January (R. 181). An examination of
' •
closes that the check was honored by the bank. It noi
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stamped "Heturn to Sender" or ''lrnmfficient Funds,"
cwd there is no other indication that the check bounced.
Since Carrolls adduced no evidence id(•ntifying this check
as not having been properly honored, or any evidence to
create any disbelief that Defendants had in fact made
of January 10, it is submitted that the check
is the weightier evidence. Therefore, Defendants should
be entitled to a credit for this payment.
3. 'L'he Carroll Accounting did not provide an addition for taxes on November 30, 1960, in the amount of
$133.98 (Ex. 7-P). Mr. Farr submitted interrogatories
to the Defendants, in which he set forth a schedule of
real estate taxes on the subject property (R. 27). He
requested that the De.fendants admit the correctness of
sucl1 schedule, and the Defendants did admit that the
schedule of taxes was in fact correct (R. 31). However,
the answer to the interrogatory in no way admitted that
the Plaintiffs had paid the taxes, and were not reimbursed by the Defendants. Mrs. Barbara Place of DoxeyLayton Company testified that Doxey-Layton had paid
the taxes ewry year the contract was in force (R. 224).
Based upon the answers to the interrogatories, Mr. Farr
look the liberty of adding said amount in his accountings,
which were received into evidence, notwithstanding the
lack of proper foundation, qualification, and considering
tliat they were nothing more than hearsay evidence. The
Defendant Phil M. Birdsall testified that he paid the
every year (R. 209), and the fact that Defendants
reimbursed Plaintiffs for tax<c>s is somewhat corrobor-

14
atoo by a notation on Exhibit ()_p which
tliat
the 1958 taxes 1\·ere paid, although said acconnting did
not have a formal rntry of the paymrnt of such taxes.
The Defendant Phil l\I. Birdsall further indicah·<l that lit
paid the taxes in cash ( R. 210). Mr. Carroll tPstifieil
that the exclusion of tlie taxes from the aeeounting waf
an oversight, and should have been included (R. 2711,
without there being any specific testimony or c•vid(·nct
of how he could haYe vossibly remembered snch a thing
for so many years hack. Judge Hanson had ('arlier commented in the trial that he didn't think that it \ms proper
for Mr. Farr to vary the orig·inal accounting recordi
(R. 155). Where, as in this case, there is an original
accounting record, which is of ancient origin and there
is no similar documentary evidence of Pqual
and no othe1 s1Jecific testimony or evidence which identifies the particular transaction in question, it would seem
to this author gross error to permit a rnriance from
the original Canoll Accounting.
4. Exhibit 9-P of Plaintiffs' orig·inal al'eonnting
records contains a credit to thP Ddendants tor a $150.0I!
payment on J nne 20, 1964. Mr. Farr introdncPd Exhibit
25-P, which is a had
from Defendant Phil Birdiall
to Wayne Carroll in the amount of
m: jnstifica
tion for crediting the DPfendants with a payment of il]ll:
$106.75 on that 1-iarticular datP. Mr. Canol111e\·er real],
113
tied the bounced check in with anv evidem·<·, and '
certainly very indPfinite as to whethe>r or not the cheet
n_'}1c
boiuii'l'd
1
sl1ould liave 'oeen cliarged l)ack (l->.
_, 189-).
u

I

If)
diook might have been for taxes and insurance, and later

could have been redeemed by the Defendants for cash,
or any number of things could hav0 possibly happened.
Moreover, it would have been very simple for Mr. Carroll
to have made a reversing entry on his accounting records.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the original accounting
record is the best evidence available to the Court, and
without a much stronger showing by the Plaintiff, the
lower court should have been eompelled to give the
appropriate weight to the original accounting record of
the Plaintiffs.

5. On November 30, 1965, Mr. Farr again took the
liberty of adding $189.61 for 1965 taxes, notwithstanding
the fact that Mr. Carroll had not charged this amount
lo the Defandants in his original accounting (Ex. 10-P).
Mr. Carroll testified that said taxes should have been
entered on the record, but were not because of an oversight (R. 271). He again failed to give any reasons for
the oversight, or any compelling testimony which should
be of sufficient weight to vary from the original accounting record which he made at the time of the transaction.
The reasons set forth above as to ifom 3 apply with
equal force to Mr. Farr's deviation from the original
record in this instance.
6. On December 16, 1966, the Defendants purchased
a tape recorded for the Plaintiffs. The Defendants obtained said tape recorder from Semco, and no other items
were purchased from Semco (R. 205-07 & 218-19). They
[Jaid $103.50 for said tape recorder (Ex. 26-D). Mr.

]( i

Carroll testified th1J lie gave them crPdit for wltoba!P
price (R. 11i(i), arnl tlwt am01rnt
,,a,
(Ex. 10-P). However, there is no
in the nt11rd
to indicate
other man that tlw J)<'frrnlants att11
paid $10:L)O !'or ,-;aid taiw n·<'ord1·r. ,\1·eordingl1,
the additional credit of $22.17 ought to bt• giwn tJ1P
Defendants.
7. It is the eontention of tlw Deit>nclants tl1at !1111
payments in the amount of $125.00 werP made on Marcil
13, 1967, but that the Plaintiffs only gav1· en"dit for
payment (Ex. 10-P).
19-D eontai11s
of
two receipts e\·id<'ncing two payments: H<'cPipi No.
to Phil Birdsall for pa,rnwnt of $1 :23.00
:-;igill'd 11«
Mary W. Carroll, and Receipt No. OU7fi tu J'hil BirJ,aD
for $125.00 was initiak·d
\Vay1w K Canoll (Rm
73). Mr. Carroll testified that only 01w payrn1·nt "':J'
made on that datP, ai1d explained that l1is \rifr 11cnall.1
wade tlw
and n-'ceipts \\'<']'(' made up at tit"
1'arne tim<'. \VlH'n lw "·ent to make up a de11osit on tlu;
occasion, he started to write a receipt and didn 'i
<l11plil'ak until aft(•r the n·<·Pipt \\<lS partialJ)· Jllilil'
out ( R. 177). 1-fo also testified that the
BishojJ
the l\lar<'li, April and ::\In.\ pa,rnwnt' fi1;
19G7, and that he had enter<'<l crt'cli t 011 Jii:-; ;H·r'<•i!Jltin:
card for said paymrnb (R. 178, & Ex. ±1-1'). In adili
11
tion, he testifi<'d that neithPr of the original t't' 1'·' J1''
were given to the Birdsalls (R. 273). However. dw
author woukl

·

<lll<"st1011

.

why Mr.

('

.. j I j • d nt ru11lili
ta ll

a110

J7

the improper receipt, if in fact it was duplication. Mr.
Birdsall testified on February 22, 1967, he was admitted
to the hospital, and that he had bePn somewhat delinquent
rlnring this period of time. As a result, Mr. Carroll would
not accept a single payment on this particular occasion
(R. 277). This is corroborated by Mrs. Birdsall's testimony to the effect that then• had been several occasions
on which double payments had bef'n re(f uired (R. 219).
Mr. Birdsall testified that Carroll had done this many
times, and that the Defendants would have to bring back
more money on the same day in order to satisfy Mr.
Carroll (R. 207-08). It is respectfully submitted that the
weight of the evidence would justify the Court's allowing
an additional credit of $125.00 to the Defendants.
Assuming that this Court reaches the same conclusion as this author, or makes a similar determination
which concludes that the mortgage balance of March 12,
1968, exceeded the balance due Plaintiffs by the Defendants on the Uniform Real Estate Contract in question, then it would be the Plaintiffs who ·were in default
on the Contract, rather than Defendants. In such an
event, the Plaintiffs were obliged by the contractual
terms to convey the property to the Defendants, subject
to the mortgage. Even though the Plaintiffs have continued to make mortgage payments after the initiation
of the repossession proceedings such that the mortgage
balance now has been reduced below the contract balance
on March 12, 1968, it seems
that they cannot
now be heard to complain, since tlwy refused to receive

any more monthl:v payments from tlte
011 t,
they had ini tiah·d said proceedings. It is,
respectfuly submitted that the lo\\'\ol' court granl('cl in
appropriate relief by allowing restitution of tlte lHemi'e'
to Plaintiffs, by quieting title in them arnl by allrl\\iH,
the Plaintiffs rents and treble damages, and eosb u!
the proceeding. Defendants suggest that thP Court ohu11ld
compel the Plaintiffs to deed tlw propert.1· tu the De
fondants, allow the Defendants a reasonalJle attorne.1'i
fee for the handling of this case, includiug the appeal,
consistent with the evidence in the record (H. 2(i3), and
costs of these proceedings. As to any arnmmt by \\'hieh
the mortgage balance might now be reduced bclO\r the
contract balance as of March 12, 1%:-\, the Court 10lwnltl
first allow the Defendants to off-set the awanlt>d attorney's fee ao·ainst
anv
deficiencv
creah·d Irr• eo11ti111tl'd
b
•
J
payments on the mortgage by the Plaintiffs. Unless tlH
Plaintiffs have 13aid the mortgage in fnll, there is still
an outstanding balance thereon whid1 approxiwate'
$2,700.00, thus creating a deficiency bdow thl' :Jlarcl1 e
1968 contract balanee of only apprnxirnatei>·
which amount the attorney's fee slwnld more than ark
quately off-set. f-Jhould the Court reach a diffrn•nt coi:
clusion, there is on file with the Salt Lake County Clerk.'
office a cash bond in the amount of $1,500.00 wl1id1 eonld
be used bv the Court to adj nst any rmnaining prohiellti
·
·
·
· tf lh ,uli
(R. 131-32). Howeyer, the Defrndants respc·c 1l . '
mit that those fonds ought to be rdnrned to the De
fendants at the conclusion of this ease.

l!l

POINT III
EVEN THOUGH THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S CONCLUSION
THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE IN DEFAULT
ON THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, IT
WAS IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
PERMIT A FORFEITURE OF THE UNIFORM REAL
ESTATE CONTRACT BY THE DEFENDANTS.

It is '•t]Je dnty of the Court to dPtermine whether
ito offae:o are heing used to exact an unconscio11able
q11il!n1c1it or amowzt." (Emphasis added.) Perkins v.
Sv11cer, 121 Utah -!GS, 243 P.2d 4-±G, 452 (Utah, 1952).
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It i::; "tl1e
of the eourt to determine ·whether
of the home and started
for it in July
of 1954. They made payments thereon, although sometunps sporadically, all during the veriod of time from
195± until tl1e Plaintiffs initiated repossession proceedmgs in this case. Even by the most liberal interpretation
of the evidence in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Defendants
had paid approximately two-thirds of the original purthase price of $11,950.00. Commencing in September of
lUGl, the• Dc·fendants started paying payments of $150.00
(Ex. 8-P), in an effort to bring delinquent payments
current on the Contract in question. Had the Defendants
LiPn ]JPrmitted to continue monthy payments of $150.00
lil'f month, as ·was demanded in the first notice of the
l'lamtiffs, any delinqtwneies soon would have been corll'ded, and tl10 contract balance would havt> been liquirlated in a relatively short fone. Moreover, when one
·rin,;iiJ1·r." that thP Plaintiffs om•d Doxey-Layton ComJlilll)'
on a mortgage against the property, and

that the contract balance, at best, was no more thai'
$4,102.46, when Plaintiffs first gave
notiri.
according to the final accounting of Mr. Farr, the Plain
tiffs' equity in the property could have been no mon
than $455.07. By comparing the equity figure with tJ
original purchase price, it is clearly seen that the Plain
tiffs had less than 4% of their contract price which tlM
had not yet received, either by way of vayments fromth1
Defendants, or by way of monies received from a mort
gage which they had placed against the property.
,
1

Also, when one reviews all of the additional credit
which were given by the Plaintiffs to Defondants, after
the various accountings were made in this case (app.li.
there seems to be reasonable merit in the position Wien
by Defendants at tl1e outset of this case; i.e., their re·
quest for a complete accounting in an effort to re<:-0ncil
differences between the parties before legal action wa:
commenced, and their imtting Plaintiffs on notice of th1
definite disagn'ement with the results of the Carroll
Accounting. In addition, there are the other items 01
transactions for the Court's consideration which tlfi
catalogued in Appendix II and Appendix TJI and whict
are argued at length in Point II hereinabove. With aii
of the variances, discrepancies, and errors which hart
been brought to light as a result of these proceeding"
certainly the Conr-t must conclude that the Ddendani'
were well within their right to demand and exprd :
.
f' d ww
thorough accounting hPfore any additwnal un s ..
paid the Plaintiffs, or
they could mah any dPtl'I
1

I

i

_.........I
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rnination as to -what their conn;e of action should be
a' a result of tlte Notice to Pay or Quit and the Notice
to Quit in this case.

'L'he granting by the lower comt of immediate restitution of th(• property to the Plaintiffs was most certainly an ''unconscionable requirement" within the meaning and spirit of the Perkins case, supra, and, specifically,
would violate the self-imposed limits of power the Courts
are willing to exercise as was very ably expressed by the
lafi> Chief .T11stice Wolfe in his concurring opinion in the
hrkins l'ase, siipra, at page ±53:
tTnconscionableness may b<> prPsent at the making of tlw contract or it may arise at the time
of default or time of enforcement. But courts
inhere11tly han· the lHl\\'Pr to refm;e to lend themselves to unconscionable acts. All that is required
is that the courts, when asked to enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract, refuse to do so
because at the time the enforcement is asked it
would be unconscionable to do so .
.fudge Hanrnn certainly recognized this principle as he
mdicated S!'Veral times throughout the trial that restitution would be unconscionable, and lw demonstrated his
111
· mictions by his written Memorandum Decision. How1·Yer, 11ith the exertion of much pressure, he was imJiropc·rly persnaded to retreat from a decision that he
had made, with a view to fundamental fairness and justice.

Althongh fop Perkins east>, s11prn, differs signifii·antly in its fact situation from the case before the

I

i

I
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Court, the case of Croft v. Jensen, 86 Utah 13, 40 P.1n
198 (Utah, 1935), is a reasonably analogous factual situ
ation to the one before the Court. A real estate contrai·t
jn the amount of $6,500.00 was involved, on which
was an unpaid balance of $200.00. The facts of the Croft
case differ from this case in that a tender of the
eontract balance was made to the seller. HowPver. it 1,
submitted that the uncertainty surrounding the contrai:i
balance in tills case well justified the Defendants in not
making a tender of the balance due under the contract
At page 202, the court indicated that
the paintiff was not entitled to declare a for.
f eiture of the contract involved in this action.
The limit and measurl' of her right to recom
because the installments were not paid when 1111
same became due was the am01unt of the in"tallmmzts together with legal interest thereon. (Em·
phasis added.)
11 0 maintain consistency with the Croft case, this Court
must deny restitution, and award Plaintiffs the differ
ence between the contract balance as of Mareh 12, 19(il
and the mortgage balance as of this time.

vVere

this Court to conclude that the Plaintilfs are
entitled to a return of the property in question, thep,
the Defendants surely are t>ntitled to a judgment
upon the unenforceab.le or unconscionable forfeiture ron
cept discussed throughout the Perkins case, supra. Dt
01111
fendants eontendPd, and add need direct
in P
.
f t1 propert1
thereon, that the reasonable rental value o ie
1
·
·
over tlrn period of tiuw m
approx·i watr<l $1 ,

:i5o.oo. as opposed to the avproximate $17,000.00 they

paid on the contract. (See app. I.) Although the Plaintiffa claimed the reasonable rental value to be $125.00
wr month, no competent evidence was adduced in sup1
1

port of such a conclusion. Accordingly, Defendants
,J10uld be entitled to a judgment against the Plaintiffs
for approximately $6,000.00 for the payment of excess
1ents, should this Court grant restitution. Moreover, it
i' submitted that the Defendants should be entitled to a
return of tlw $1,500.00 cash bond on file with the Salt
Lake County Clerk's office, since a return of the property
to the Plaintiffs in this case is a clear-cut windfall. Not
only did they effectively have little equity in the proptrty, hut the present real estate market has undoubtedly
treated a situation in which the Plaintiffs would receive
a property greatly appreciated in price and value.
POINT IV
ONCE THE TRIAL COURT HAD MADE ITS DECISION, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR SAID TRIAL
COURT TO RECONSIDER THAT DECISION.

Although the case of Drury v. Lumceford, 18 U.2d
i4, 415 P.2d 662 (Utah, 1966), considered the finality
of an order given as a result of a motion, and was not
eoncerned ·with the decision rendered by a court after
!rial, such ease has application to the case now before
the Court. At page 663 of the opinion, the now Chief
,Jnstice Crockett indicated that once the lo-wer court had
111
ade its decision, that then completed both the duty
and Prerngatiw of said court. Although the opinion does
l!otdefine what constitutes a "dt>cision," Defendants con-

tend that the l\frmorandum Dt>cision of Judge Hanso
which ·was signed and filed with the Cl('rk on ,Ju]y 2, 1911!1
constitutes such a decision within the spirit and
of the holding of the Drury case, sitpra. The wry dan
gers and problems thought to be put to rrst by !h1
Drury holding are conspicuously present in the me
before the Court, sincp Judge Hanson thereafter signtJ
and filed two separate sets of Findings, Conclusions ann
Judgments. Such final pleadings are at variance, ana
there is no clear indication in the record which set oi
final pleadings was intended by the lowt'r court to bt
the final decision.
11

I

POINT V
THE AWARD OF TREBLE DAMAGES BY THE
LOWER COURT WAS IMPROPER.

Section 78-36-G, LTtah Code Annotated 1953, pr011de1
that the notice r<"'quir<:'d in a forcible entr)T and
action must be servPd in a particular way or wa)i.
Where, as in this case, the tenant is absent from Jui
place of residence, or from his usual place of husinrs;,
"a copy of such notice may be left with a person °1
of suitable age and discretion at Pither plac<', and a cop:
thereof must be mailed to the tenant at his place of rrsi
.
dence or place of busrness."
The Return of' k8ervice. of
the Notice to Pay or Quit, as to Defendant Phil M. Bir.a
sail indicates that a co1)Y thereof was left with his
'
•
'l d(l'
but it failed to certify that a copy of same was wai e.
the Defendant Phil M. Birdsall (R. G). I n addiltuil1
said notice demanded the full payment of the delinqnen I

I

lmlaitcP, which was substantiall)' m error, and put Defi·ndants on notict: that the contract balance was $4,i±O..J-4, qnite a bit more than was due to Plaintiffo on
Ow Contract. :Moreover, the noticP mad<> a demand for
an attorney's foe of $475.50, whiC'h,
any standard, is
an outrageous fee for the preparation of such a notice,
and for thP services which are attendant therewith. Certainly, snch a notice cannot be permitted to stand where
it; dPrnand:; are improper and unlawful. 'rhe Defendants
ai,ertPd the invalidity of the
notices in their
answer (R. 9 and 11). The ca:se of Van Zyverden v.
Farrar, 15 U.2d 3G7, 393 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah, 1964),
sptlls out the fact that a preliminary notice is required
to place the buyer in the status of a tenant at will, and
until that is done, the buyer would not be amenable to
the notice provided in Section 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated. Unless there has been strict compliance with these
requirements, then the forcible entry and detainer action
does not lie. Since the Plaintiffs in this ca:se failed to
0tri0!ly comply with the service requirements as to Defendant PhH M. Birdsall,
forcible entry and detainer action does not lie against him.
The Perkins case, sitprn, at page 449, has met the
rery problem before this Court. Mrs. Perkins had been
t:ernonally served, and a copy of the notice had been
with Mrs. Perkins for Mr. Perkins. However, no
eu]J) was mailed to Mr. Perkins. 'rhis Court, through
Justirt> CroekPtt, concluded that since Mr. Perkins was
111
possession, the continued possession by Mrs. PPrkins

could resnlt in no additional damagt> to 8penctc•rs. Ewri
though the trial court awarded treble damages as against
Mrs. Perkins, the Utah Supreme Court reversed, anddtclined to allow treble damages as to either person. TlMt
fore, the Carrolls are not entitled to treble damage' in
this case, as to either of the Defendants.
CONCLUSION
Passing upon the weight of the evidence in the
ord, as this Court must, the conclusion that the Defendants were not in default on the U nifonu Real Estate
Contract is amply supported hy the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, restitution of the property to !lw
Plaintiffs is improper.
Even though this Court concludes that the weight ol
the evidence supported the conclusion of the lower court
that the Defendants were in default on the Unifonn Real
Estate Contract, the evidence in this case is 8uch that
the allowance of restitution of the pro1wr-ty to tlw Plaintiffs shocks the conscience, and such a remedy to the
Plaintiffs is an unconscionable forfeitnrr, and Bho1tld bt
disallowed.

It is respectfully submitted that this Conrt must
reverse the lowt>r cou.rt and the case should be rpmanded
'I.
to the lower court f or f.urth er procee d.mgs
"' with
the opinion of the appellate court.
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Costs and an attorney's fee should be awarded
,\
endants.

Respectfully :-;ubmitted,

KENNETH RIGTRUP
466 East 5th South, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellants

APPENDIX I
Payments required of Defendants under the terms of the
Uniform Real Estate Contract of July 1, 1954, between the
parties, from inception of the confract to and including the
12th day of March, 1968, the date on which Plaintiffs instituted repossession action in this case (R. 3):

Year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Required yearly payments

-----------------------------------$
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1,000.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
1,200.00
300.00

Total required payments
under Contract to date
repossession proceedings
instituted ----------------------------$17,000.00
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Payments made by Defendants to the Plaintiffs as per Farr
Accounting No. 1 (Ex. 11-P):
1954
Hl55
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

------------------------------------$
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ --------- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------·----- ---------------·--·
---------------------------------------------------------------------

300.00
906.08
1,049.02
1,308.92
1,313,86
1,256.12
635.00
1,146.37
1,800.00
1,652.40
1,474.31
1,552.70
1,281.33
1,200.00
150.00

Total payments - Farr
Accounting No. 1 --------------$17,026.11

:m
Payments made by Defendants to Plaintiffs as per Farr
Accounting No. 2 (Ex. 42-P):
Year

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Amount
----·-----------------------------$ 300.00
916.08
-----------------------------·-·-·
986.51
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,336.43
·----------------------------------- 1,298.86
---------------------------------- 1,206.12
735.00
---------------------------------1,146.37
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,650.00
---------------------------------- 1,803.20
-------·-----------------------··· 1,457.69
-------·-·······------------------- 1,418.54
1,275.78
····-------·-·····--···-·---·-·····
·------------···-·-·········--------1,281.33
-·····-·····-·····--------------·-· 225.00

Total payments - Farr
Accounting No. 2 ··········--·-$17,036.91

:n
Payments made by Defendants to the Plaintiffs as per
original Carroll Accounting (EiXs. 4-P through 10-P) :
Amount

Year

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1953
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

--------- -- --·------------ ----------$
---------------------------------------- -- --- -------------- -- -- ---------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- ---------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------- ------ --------------------------------------- ------------·-·---------------------·----·--·---------------- ----- -- -------·---------·----------------· -- ---------------------------------------·---· ---· ------------------- ---·-------------------·-------

Total payments - Carroll
Accounting ----·----------·--------

300.00
951.08
1,022.83
1,238.92
1,194.40
1,150.00
585.00
1,196.37
1,800.00
1,652.40
1,650.93
1,350.84
1,281.33
1,125.00
150.00
$16,649.10

Plus: Additional payments Plaintiffs stipulated Defena.
ants paid Plaintiffs, and which were not included in tne
Carroll Accounting (these are credited in Ex. 11-P, Farr
Accounting No. l, consistent with the oral stipulation entered between respective counsel):
Date

Payment

12/31/56 (R. 149-50) ........ $
1/6/57 (R. 148 & 164) ..... .
2/6/57 (R. 148 & 165) _____ _
2/17/59 (R. 149 & 164) ... .
1/16/60 (R. 149 & 164) ... .
2/25/63 (R. 149 & 164) ... .
1/27/65 & 2/7/65
(R. 149 & Ex. 17-D) _____ _
5/6/65 (R. 149 & 165) _____ _
6/23/65 (R. 149 & 165) ....
8/10/67 (R. 149) ----···----···

26.19
35.00
35.00
106.12
50.00
.80
1.16
75.14
125.56
75.00

Total credits not received by
Defendants in Carroll Accounting

$

Total payments - Adjusted Carroll
Accounting ·······-···------------

$17,179.07

527.97

Payments made by Defendants to Plaintiffs, as per the
Blauer Accounting (Ex. 32-D) :

Year

Amount

1954 ·····-·········-···········-------$ 670.00
976.08
1955 ·-·············-···················
1,022.83
1956 ·-·--··-·····--···················-1957 ·-------·--·-··--·--········--·-····1,308.99
1,330.46
1958 ··--······--···----·--·-·-·········1,256.12
1959 ·······-·····-····-·················
635.00
1960 ·····-······················-··-···
1,196.37
1961 ··-··············-·········--·-····1,800.00
1962 ·-····-·······················--····
1,652AO
1963 ---··-··············-··-··-········
1,650.94
1964 -····--·······-··-··-···-···········
1,552.70
1965 ···'·---·-········--···-············
1966 --·-·------··--··--·-····-------····1,303.50
1,350.00
1967 ·-·'·-·······-·················-···
1968 ·····-··········-------------····-- 150.00
Total payments - Blauer
Accounting ·--·-·-------·---------·$17,855.39
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Rents on property from July 1, 1954, possession
11
and including March 31, 1968, based upon an $85.00
month rental payment (Findings of Fact, R. 105, Par. 12)
Year

1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

Amount

------------------------------------$
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

510.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
1,020.00
255.00

Total rents property would
have yielded to month of
commencement of proceedings @ $85.00 per month--$14,025.00

Rents on property from July 1, 1954, possession date, to
and including March 31, 1968, based upon a $70.00 per
month rental payment (R. 204, & 217-18; and for evidence
in support of Carroll conclusion that rental value was $125.00
per month, see R. 159) :

Year
1954 - ----------------------------------$
1955 ------ -----------------------------1956 ------------------ -----------------1957 -----------------------------------1958 -----------------------------------1959 ----------------------------------1960 -----------------------------------1961 -------------- ------- --------------1962 -----------------------------------1963 --- --------------------------------1964 -- ---------------------------------1965 -------------- ---------------------1966 -----------------------------------1967 -------------- --- ------------------1968 ----- -------------------------------

Amount

420.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
840.00
210.00

Total rents property would
have yielded to month of
commencement of proceedings @ $70.00 per month .. $11,550.00
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APPENDIX II
Contract and mortgage balances on March 12, 1968, tn'
date of the service of the Notice to Pay or Quit (R. 4-6):
Carroll Accounting (Ex. 10-P) _____ ----------$ 4,787.96
Farr Account No. 1 (Ex. 11-P) __________________ 4,201.42
Farr Account No. 2 (Ex. 42-P) ________________ *4,102.46
Blauer Accounting (Ex. 32-D) ______________ **2,792.91
Doxey-Layton Mortgage Balance
(Ex. 31-D) --------------- --------------- ----- _ 3,647.39
*The balance on the Farr Accounting No. 2 of $4,133.24
was reduced by the amount of $30.78 consistent with the
acknowledged error made by Mr. Farr in his Answers to
Defendants' Objections (R. 96), which acknowledged that
said accounting included an item for taxes for January 5.
1958, in the amount of $16.75, plus applicable interest in the
amount of $14.03 (R. 73).
**The balance of the Blauer Accounting of $2,538.23
was increased by the amount of $254.48 to correct the error
made by Blauer on the entry of January 5, 1955, where
$57.86 interest was deducted, rather than added (Ex. 32-D).
The $254.48 adjustment was made by adding the $115.72 net
error and the applicable interest or $138.76.

VARIANCES BETWEEN ACCOUNTINGS
Date
Amount
Carroll
Farr
Blauer

7 /9/54
11/5/54
2/25/55
1/10/58
5/16/58
11/30/60
6/2-0/64
11/30/65
12/16/66
1/9/67

$170.00
16.43
25.00
35.00
16.60
133.98
43.25
189.61
22.17
150.00

Excluded
Excluded
Excluded
Excluded
Excluded
Excluded
Included
Excluded
Excluded
Excluded

Excluded
Included
Included
Excludea
Excluded
Included
Excluded
Included
Excluded
Included
Included
Excluded
Includ
Excluded
Included
JnclUd •
Excluded
dl
Excluded
Jnc!U f
.
t ansaction'
Payments, insurance, taxes, or other items or r
rinti·
1
in dispute which may alter the final results of the va · .
1
I

0/

Explanation
payment
;/9/54

Amount
$170.00

11/5/54

insurance
proration

16.43

36.49

!/25/55

payment

25.00

29.70

1/10/58

payment

35.00

29.32

5/16/58 payment
11/30/60 taxes

16.60
133.98

13.15
72.79

Date

*Interest
$215.20

Q/20/64

payment

43.25

10.61

i/27/6.5

payment

151.62

29.82

il/30/65 taxes
i2/16/66 tape
recorder

189.61
22.17

27.34
1.60

3/13/67

125.00

7.05

payment

Evidence
Carroll
Birdsall
Exs. 27-P,
Exs.14-D.
39-P & 40-P. R. 204 & 213.
R. 212, 267,
& 269-70.
Ex. 40-P.
Ex. 4-P,
R. 270-71.
22-P, & 27-P.
R.277.
Ex.11-P,
Ex.15-P.
22-P & 42-P. R.163 & 169.
R.178-77.
Exs. 23-P
Exs.16-D
& 24-P.
& 6-P.
R.181.
R.164, 181,
& 191.
Ex. P-2.
Ex. P-3.
R. 27, 31,
Ex. 7-P.
224 & 271.
R.155 &
209-10.
Ex. 25-P.
Exs. 9-P &
11-P.
R.183.
Exs. 20-P,
Exs.18-D
21-P.
& 20-P.
R. 175-76.
R. 271.
Ex.10-P.
Ex. 26-D.
Ex.10-P.
R. 205-07 &
R.166.
218-19.
Ex.19-D.
Ex. 41-P.
R.172-73,
R.177-78
207-08, 219
&273.
&277.

bas' 'The above interest computations were compounded on a monthly
bi' Arthur 0. Dummer, 3993 Milky Way Drive, Salt Lake City,
h,actuary and vice-president of Beneficial Life Insurance Company.
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APPENDIX III
Defendants' -Appellants' submit that the weight of the
dence in the record supports the conclusion that they ii!
entitled to additional credits against the contract
consistent with the following analysis:
Balance Farr Accounting No. 2 -

3/12/68______ $4,102.G ,

Additional credits to which DefendantsAppellants should be entitled:
Date
2/25/55
1/10/58
11/30/60
6/20/64
11/30/65
12/16/66
3/13/67

Amount
$ 25.00
35.00
133.98
43.25
189.61
22.17
125.00

Interest
$ 29.70
2'9.32
72.79
10.61
27.34
1.60
7.05

$574.01
$178.41
Less: combined principal and interest____________

-

Defendants'-Appellants' suggested contract
balance on 3/12/1958 _______________________________________ .$
Less: Doxey-Layton mortgage balance J
3,641
3/12/68
I

-------------------------------------------------------•·•······

-

Defendants' -Appellants' proposed overpayment
by Defendants at date action commenced________ $ 29'/J

